\u3cem\u3eSmith v. Bates Technical College\u3c/em\u3e: Washington Extends the Availability of the Tort of Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy, But a Little Too Far: Employees Should Still Exhaust Other Remedies by Morris, Richard A.
Smith v. Bates Technical College: Washington Extends
the Availability of the Tort of Wrongful Discharge in
Violation of Public Policy, But a Little Too Far:
Employees Should Still Exhaust Other Remedies
Richard A. Morris*
I. INTRODUCTION
Bates Technical College (Bates), a Washington State-operated
vocational-technical institution, employed Kelly Smith as a television
traffic programmer.' Washington law entitled her to civil service pro-
tection, and the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) of her state
employees union also afforded her negotiated grievance procedure
coverage.2
Bates fired Smith, an eight-year employee, for alleged disruptive
and insubordinate behavior. 3 Smith filed a grievance under the CBA,
protesting her termination.4 She also filed charges with the State un-
der civil service laws, claiming unfair labor practices.5 Smith's griev-
ance proceeded to arbitration, where the arbitrator issued an award in
her favor.' Bates reinstated Smith to a comparable position and pro-
vided back pay and related benefits.7 Smith then filed suit in Pierce
County Superior Court, seeking damages for various tort and statutory
claims.8 The trial court granted Bates's summary judgment motion in
part and dismissed Smith's wrongful discharge claim for failure to ex-
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1. See Smith v. Bates Technical Coll., 139 Wash. 2d 793, 796, 991 P.2d 1135, 1137 (2000).
2. Id. at 794, 991 P.2d at 1137.
3. Id. at 798, 991 P.2d at 1138.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 799, 991 P.2dat 1138.
6. Id. at 798, 991 P.2d at 1138.
7. Id. at 799, 991 P.2d at 1138.
8. Id. at 799, 991 P.2d at 1139.
Seattle University Law Review
haust her remedies.9 The Washington Supreme Court ultimately re-
versed the trial court's dismissal of Smith's wrongful discharge in vio-
lation of public policy claim.1"
In its January 27, 2000 decision, the Washington Supreme Court
held that the common law tort of wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy is available to all employees, whether terminable-at-will
or covered by a CBA or other administrative procedure." The court
also held that an employee need not exhaust contractual or administra-
tive remedies before bringing an independent tort action of this kind.' 2
Previously, the public policy tort was available only to at-will employ-
ees who had no other recourse. Smith v. Bates Technical College
changes the common law in Washington by extending the availability
of the public policy tort to employees already protected by CBA "for
cause" provisions or, in the case of public employees, administrative
appeal procedures. This expansion creates an additional avenue of
appeal and additional remedies not previously available. Furthermore,
it may lead to an increase in tort filings, the threat of lawsuits to lever-
age more favorable settlements, and to erosion of union influence and
strength.
This Note will present and analyze two significant issues ad-
dressed by the Smith court. First, the court properly decided that state
common law claims are not preempted by collective bargaining
agreements or available administrative procedures. Second, the court
incorrectly determined that exhaustion of administrative or contrac-
tual remedies is not a prerequisite to seeking tort relief in court. 3 The
judiciary should give deference to administrative or contractual proce-
dures specifically designed to resolve the matter in dispute.
This Note will analyze the preemption issue by first examining,
in Part II, the general function of common law torts, the doctrine of
employment-at-will, and the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy. Part III reviews the policy underlying the public policy
tort, a United States Supreme Court decision on preemption, 4 and the
law of other states regarding the public policy tort." Part IV analyzes
the Smith court's reasoning and findings on the availability of the pub-
lic policy tort in Washington. Finally, Part V addresses Washington
9. Id. at 799, 991 P.2dat 1138.
10. Id. at 816, 991 P.2d at 1147.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. The court also addressed a First Amendment issue, which is beyond this Note's scope.
See id. at 811, 991 P.2d at 1145,.
14. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
15. The states are split on the CBA preemption issue. See discussion infra Part III(C).
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case law on the issue of exhaustion of remedies and applies the law to
the facts in Smith.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Defining the Function of Common Law Torts
There is no all-encompassing definition of torts. Very broadly, a
tort is a civil wrong carried out by one party against another party in
breach of a duty and resulting in injury. 6 To give more content to
this definition, it is perhaps best to start by identifying the purpose of
tort law-in contrast, for example, to the purposes of contract and
criminal law. Contract law protects a single, limited interest: having
the promises of others performed.' Criminal law protects the inter-
ests of the public at large, as represented by the state. The purpose of
criminal law is most often effectuated by extracting a penalty from the
wrongdoer.'" The purpose of tort law, on the other hand, is to adjust
the losses arising from the civil wrongs of one party against another, as
a result of the conduct of the other. 9 Historically, the law of torts has
been concerned with the compensation of the losses to individuals,
rather than to the public at large. A successful plaintiff in a tort action
will therefore recover money damages for the injuries suffered at the
hand of the tortfeasor.
However, the purpose of tort law has evolved. "Perhaps more
than any other branch of the law, the law of torts is a battleground of
social theory."2" The last century has seen an increased recognition of
the impact that private disputes have on society's interests in general. 2'
This impact may occur in either of two ways: as punishment of the
tortfeasor, so as to deter further tortious actions or unsafe behaviors,
or as vindication of a recognized public interest.22 When the decisions
of the courts become known, there is a strong deterrent effect on those
who may potentially act contrary to public interests. Further, the
court decisions make normative statements about desirable or undesir-
able behavior. In this way, tort law encourages employees and em-
ployers, as well as citizens in general, to meet their societal and com-
munity obligations.
16. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 4-5 (5th ed. 1984).
17. Id. at 5.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 6.
20. Id. at 15.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 6, 25.
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B. The Doctrine of Employment-at-Will
The common law doctrine of employment-at-will provides that,
absent a contract of specific duration, either party may terminate an
employment relationship at any time.2' An employer can discharge an
at-will employee for good cause, for no cause, or even for bad cause,
without being guilty of an unlawful act.24
There have always been exceptions to the employment-at-will
doctrine, including express and implied contracts, collective bargain-
ing agreement provisions, and statutory protections.2' As employment
law has evolved, the number of exceptions to the doctrine has in-
creased. These exceptions fall into three general categories: con-
tracts,26 statutes,27 and torts.2' Recently, tort claims-including the
tort of wrongful discharge-have increasingly been used in employ-
ment disputes. 29 Because of growing societal and judicial reaction to
incidents of egregious employer conduct, wrongful discharge in viola-
tion of public policy is one of the most rapidly growing torts in this
area of the law.
C. The Tort of Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy
The tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy is an
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. This tort provides a
way to identify certain reasons for discharge that will support an ac-
tion for wrongful discharge." Those reasons are ones that contravene
public policy.3 One of the earliest recognitions of this tort was by a
23. MARK W. BENNETT ET AL., EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS: LAW & PRACTICE §
2.02[A] (1999 Supp.).
24. See, e.g., Payne v. Western & At. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507 (1884).
25. 1 PAUL H. TOBIAS, LITIGATING WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CLAIMS 1-2 (2001).
26. Examples include explicit contracts, employee handbooks, and implied promises by
actions.
27. Examples include the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2001), and the
Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-77 (2001), both of which forbid retalia-
tion for the exercise of rights under the law.
28. Examples include wrongful discharge, negligent discharge, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and tortious interference with a contract.
29. 1 TOBIAS, supra note 25, at 3.
30. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 698 (2nd ed. 1999).
31. This usually occurs when an employee is terminated for exercising some right or re-
sponsibility clearly established by public policy. Mark E. Brossman & Laurie C. Malkin, Beyond
the Implied Contract: The Public Policy Exception, The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing, and Other Limitations on an Employer's Discretion in the At Will Setting, in WRONGFUL
TERMINATION CLAIMS 2000, at 691 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course, Handbook Series
No. HO-0050, 2000).
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California appeals court in the 1959 decision, Petermann v. Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 396.32
Petermann was a union business agent, who refused to commit
perjury in testimony concerning union corruption.3 3 Petermann con-
tested his discharge by the union, and the court recognized this new
tort claim, stating that "the right to discharge an employee ... may be
limited by ... public policy."34 However, the wrongful discharge tort
did not gain wider acceptance until after Professor Lawrence E.
Blade's 1967 article3" advocating' the adoption of this new cause of ac-
tion.36 By the end of the 1980's, the majority of states recognized the
doctrine,37 although there were significant differences in what the
source of public policy should be.3"
Washington first recognized the public policy tort in 1984, in
Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co.39 Thompson involved an employee
who claimed that he was fired for instituting accounting procedures
that ensured compliance with a federal antibribery statute.4" In
Thompson, the Washington Supreme Court stated: "We join the grow-
ing majority of jurisdictions and recognize a cause of action in tort for
wrongful discharge if the discharge of the employee contravenes a
clear mandate of public policy." 4' The court regarded this tort as an
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.42 The court noted that
the exception has been used where the employment-at-will doctrine
would have "led to a result clearly inconsistent with a stated public
policy and the community interest it advances." 43 As an example, the
Thompson court noted a case where the employer would be liable for
discharge because the discharge "would otherwise frustrate a clear
manifestation of public policy .... 44
32. 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
33. Id. at 26.
34. Id. at 27.
35. Lawrence E. Blade, Employment-at-Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abu-
sive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967).
36. Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-at-will: the Impending Death of a Doctrine, 37 AM.
BUS. L.J. 653, 659 (2000).
37. Id. at 664.
38. Examples include performing a public obligation (e.g., jury duty), whistleblowing, ex-
ercising statutory appeal rights, filing for workers' compensation, reporting violations of con-
sumer protection or safety regulations, and reporting criminal activities.
39. 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984).
40. Id. at 223, 685 P.2d at 1084.
41. Id. at 232, 685 P.2d at 1089.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 231, 685 P.2d at 1088.
44. Id. at 232, 685 P.2d at 1088-89.
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III. AVAILABILITY OF THE PUBLIC POLICY TORT TO EMPLOYEES
WHO MAY ONLY BE TERMINATED FOR CAUSE
A. The Policy Issues Behind the Public Policy Tort
Tort law has evolved to include, as one of its purposes, the vindi-
cation of a recognized public interest. The need to encourage the
meeting of societal obligations is expressed nowhere as strongly as in
the relatively recent tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy.4" As noted above, a majority of jurisdictions now recognize
this tort.46 Although there may be differences over the source of the
policy, the common thread is the recognition of an underlying societal
activity in which the discharged employee was engaged. However, it
is not clear or agreed upon whether the primary function of the tort
claim is the vindication of the societal interest involved in that activity,
or the adjustment of the losses arising from the wrongs of one party
against another.47
The availability of damages under the public policy tort has been
a major consideration in many jurisdictions. Unionized employees are
essentially limited to breach of contract remedies, which traditionally
include reinstatement, back pay, and recoverable benefits. 4' Tort
remedies, such as punitive damages and recovery for emotional dis-
tress, are generally not available in contract cases.49 Precluding these
additional forms of remedy would seemingly disadvantage a unionized
worker. However, one must look at both the general and particular
tradeoffs in the larger picture of collective bargaining to determine if
the unionized worker is truly disadvantaged.
Bypassing a bargained-for, CBA-based, remedy ultimately weak-
ens the union's role in employment matters and undermines the labor-
management relationship. If the grievance-arbitration procedure was
no longer the exclusive remedy for resolving discharge disputes, em-
ployees could forum shop, or possibly relitigate the merits of their
claims. This would have the foreseeable impact of weakening the un-
45. See McQuary v. Bel Air Convalescent Home, Inc., 684 P.2d 21, 23 (Or. Ct. App.
1984) (holding that a discharge for reporting nursing home violations to the state health division
under Oregon's Nursing Home Patient's Bill of Rights would be a discharge for fulfilling a socie-
tal obligation); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 377 n.7 (Cal. 1988) (holding that
the public policy tort vindicates the public interest in not permitting employers to impose on
employees requirements that cause the employees to act contrary to public policy).
46. See ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 30.
47. See 2 HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 7.12
(4th ed. 1998).
48. Jane Byeff Korn, Collective Rights and Individual Remedies: Rebalancing the Balance Af-
ter Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1149, 1156-57 (1990).
49. Brossman & Malkin, supra note 31, at 737-38.
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ion's role in the collective bargaining process. Indeed, some employ-
ees may no longer see a need for a union at all, if their primary interest
is simply job protection. Employers may even be inclined to exclude
arbitration procedures from CBAs, even though such procedures may
afford the quickest, most efficient form of dispute resolution for all
parties."0 If employees were permitted several bites of the apple by us-
ing successive dispute resolution forums, employers might seek con-
cessions from the union during bargaining, in exchange for a griev-
ance-arbitration procedure. This might tip the scales against union
gains in other areas, such as wages, benefits, and working conditions.
Further, many workers lack the financial means to pursue private
litigation in the courts. Professor Clyde W. Summers has observed
that "[t]hey cannot afford a lawyer, and the claims are too small to
produce a viable contingency fee.""1  Professor Summers also notes
that the large punitive and emotional distress awards in public policy
tort cases really represent a lottery with a few big winners and many
losers.5 2 Although the availability of additional tort damages may be
attractive to employees initially, the ultimate result for unionized em-
ployees may be negative: a losing case, an unintended decline in un-
ionization, and a loss of leverage in the collective bargaining process.
Thus, in consideration of the dollar cost to workers (as Professor
Summers notes) and of the potential damage to unionization as a
whole, one may argue that deference to arbitration through a CBA
should be the preferred dispute resolution method for unionized work-
ers. 3 Possible solutions to the negative impact on collective bargain-
ing include the following: elimination of extra-contractual remedies
from common law wrongful discharge; provision of statutory arbitra-
tion of discharge for at-will employees; and inclusion of extra-
contractual remedies in CBAs. Also, there is some authority stating
that arbitrators may have the power to award punitive damages. 4 Ar-
bitrators' reluctance in this area may result more from tradition than
50. Kom, supra note 48, at 1172.
51. Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67
NEB. L. REV. 7, 25 (1988).
52. Id. at 27.
53. In fact, Washington has long favored arbitration of employment disputes. See, e.g.,
Munsey v. Walla Walla Coll., 80 Wash. App. 92, 94, 906 P.2d 988, 989 (1995) (noting the
strong public policy in Washington favoring arbitration of disputes; among other things, arbitra-
tion eases court congestion, provides an expeditious method of resolving disputes, and is gener-
ally less expensive than litigation).
54. See MARVIN F. HILL, JR., & ANTHONY V. SINICROPI, REMEDIES IN ARBITRATION
444-47 (2nd ed. 1999). But the majority of authority holds that punitive damages should not be
available in the arbitration process.
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from the force of the law. 5 Nevertheless, this reluctance would, as the
Smith court noted, illogically grant at-will employees greater protec-
tion from these tortious terminations than unionized workers. 6
B. Preemption of Tort Claims by Collective Bargaining Agreements
Employees who are represented by unions are usually covered by
a CBA, which typically provides that an employee may not be termi-
nated without good cause. The CBA also provides a grievance-
arbitration procedure for employees to challenge terminations. Courts
have uniformly held that where a claim involves a negotiable right,
subject to the provisions of a CBA, the grievance procedure is exclu-
sive and bars a common law action for breach of contract. 7 The filing
of a common law tort action, however, receives different treatment.
Although state labor-management relations are not covered by
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),5" it is instructive to look at
analogous federal labor law preemption policy. In Lingle v Norge, 9
Jonna Lingle alleged that she was discharged for filing a workers'
compensation claim.6° She filed a grievance under her union's CBA
and a tort action in state court for retaliatory discharge.61 Although an
arbitrator ordered her reinstated with back pay, she continued pursu-
ing her tort claim. Illinois recognizes the tort of retaliatory discharge
for filing workers' compensation claims.62 Lingle's state tort claim was
removed to federal district court, which dismissed the claim, as pre-
empted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.63
The district court concluded that a claim of retaliation was "inextrica-
bly intertwined" with the CBA provision on discharge for just cause
only and that allowing the state claim to proceed would undermine the
55. However, it is likely that employers would resist the inclusion, in CBAs, of non-
traditional remedies such as punitive damages. For a detailed analysis of these options, see
Henry J. Perritt, Jr., Symposium, Beyond Collective Bargaining and Employment-At- Will: the Fu-
ture of Wrongful Dismissal Claims: Where Does employer Self-interest Lie?, 58 U. CIN. L. REV.
397, 1194-96 (1989).
56. Smith, 139 Wash. 2d at 805, 991 P.2d at 1141.
57. CHARLES S. BAKALY, JR., THE MODERN LAW OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS
233 (2nd ed. 1989) (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985)).
58. Section 2 of the NLRA as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 152 (2001), excludes coverage for states and political subdivisions. State law governs
labor relations in public employment (non-federal).
59. 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
60. Id. at 401.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 406.
63. Labor Management Relations Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2001). § 301 provides a
cause of action for breach of a collective bargaining agreement. A tort claims is preempted by §
301 if it is "inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of a labor contract." See
Korn, supra note 48, at 1163 (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213 (1985)).
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arbitration process in the CBA.64 The Seventh Circuit affirmed, find-
ing that "the same analysis of facts" was implicated under both proce-
dures.6"
The Supreme Court, however, reversed, holding that the state
tort claim was not preempted by the CBA "just cause" provision.66
The Court found that the state claim was "'independent' of the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement in the sense of 'independent' that matters
for § 301 pre-emption purposes: resolution of the state-law claim does
not require construing the collective-bargaining agreement."67 Even
though the arbitrator would need to decide the same facts as in the tort
claim, the terms of the CBA would not need to be interpreted for pur-
poses of the tort claim. Thus, a claim under state law (including, for
example, a common law public policy claim) can survive preemption
by federal labor law if it does not require construction or interpretation
of the CBA.68
C. The Public Policy Tort in Other Jurisdictions
State courts disagree on whether the tort of wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy is available only to at-will employees, or to
all employees including those covered by CBAs or statutory protec-
tions. These decisions are generally based on the underlying purpose
in recognizing the tort in that jurisdiction.
A number of state courts have held that all employees may file
public policy tort claims, regardless of existing contractual rights.
Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc." is a case frequently cited for its
holding that CBA-protected union members retain the right to sue in
court for the public policy tort. The Illinois Supreme Court's holding
in Midgett was based on the need to afford an employee a complete
remedy (i.e., punitive damages). "[T]he recognition of a cause of ac-
tion in tort merely allows an employee an additional remedy in areas
where strong public policies, as opposed to purely private interests, are
involved."7 Similarly, in Retherford v. AT&T Communications of the
Mountain States, Inc.," the Utah Supreme Court found that all em-
64. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 1448, 1449 (S.D. Ill. 1985).
65. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 823 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir. 1987).
66. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 413.
67. Id. at 407.
68. Id. at 413 ("In sum, we hold that an application of state law is preempted by § 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 only if such application requires the interpretation
of a collective-bargaining agreement.").
69. 473 N.E.2d 1280 (Ill. 1984).
70. Id. at 1284.
71. 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992).
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ployees, whether covered by employment contracts or at-will, can file
tort actions for discharge in violation of public policy. 72 The court
noted both the vindication of public policy and the difference in reme-
dies:
A primary purpose behind giving employees a right to sue for
discharges in violation of public policy is to protect the vital
state interest embodied in such policies. We cannot fulfill such
a purpose if we hinge this cause of action on employees' contrac-
tual status and thus limit its availability to any one class of em-
ployees.73
[A]n employer who violates clear and substantial public policies
should be liable for the more expansive penalties of tort, a poten-
tially harsher liability commensurate with the greater wrong
against society. 4
Other cases have allowed for public policy tort claims on the be-
lief that the arbitration process is inadequate. For example, in Cole-
man v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,75 the Kansas Supreme Court found that
the arbitration procedure is not designed to protect the individual
rights and public policy interest in this area.76  The Coleman court
cited the Supreme Court's decision, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver,
Inc. ,77 for the proposition that arbitration is a potentially inferior proc-
ess for public policy tort issues. Other state supreme courts have
reached similar conclusions.78
In contrast, courts in other states, although recognizing the pub-
lic policy tort, have extended it only to at-will employees and not to
those covered by CBA provisions. For example, the New Mexico Su-
preme Court in Silva v. Albuquerque Assembly & Distribution Freeport
Warehouse Corp.79 found that "if an employee is protected from
wrongful discharge by an employment contract, the intended protec-
tion afforded by the retaliatory discharge [tort] action is unnecessary
and inapplicable."8 " The Silva court found that the express reason for
recognizing this tort was the need to encourage job security for those
72. Id. at 953-54.
73. Id. at 960.
74. Id.
75. 752 P.2d 645 (Kan. 1988).
76. Id. at 651.
77. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
78. See 2 PERRITT, supra note 47, § 7.41. Perritt cites cases in Maryland, Hawaii, Iowa,
and New Jersey.
79. 738 P.2d 513 (N.M. 1987).
80. !d. at 515.
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employees without an employment contract.8' Likewise, the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania in Phillips v. Babcock & Wilcox8 2 found that
the difference in remedies was not enough to justify the extension of
coverage of the public policy tort to employees covered by labor agree-
ments.8 3 The Phillips court took into consideration "the strong public
policy which favors the rights of parties to enter into contracts." 84
The Wyoming Supreme Court in Hermreck v. United Parcel Ser-
vice, Inc.8 ' deferred to the existence of another remedy: "It is clear
then that the whole rationale undergirding the public policy exception
is the vindication or protection of certain strong policies of the com-
munity. If these policies or goals are preserved by other remedies,
then the public policy is sufficiently served." 86 Other courts have
similarly restricted the availability of the public policy tort. 7
IV. SMITH V. BATES AND THE PUBLIC POLICY TORT
A. Smith v. Bates Technical College-Facts and Issues
Bates Technical College is a vocational-technical institution op-
erated by the State of Washington. 8 Beginning in February 1986,
Bates employed Kelly Smith as a traffic programmer for its onsite tele-
vision station. 9 As a state technical college employee, Smith was af-
forded civil service protections under Washington law.9" She was also
a member of the Tacoma Association of Public School Professional-
Technical Employees Union. Smith's union elected to participate in
the collective bargaining process,92 which provided for coverage under
the State Public Employment Collective Bargaining statute.93 There-
81. See id. (citing Vigil v. Arizona, 699 P.2d 613, 619 (N.M. 1983)).
82. 503 A.2d 36 (Pa. 1986).
83. Id. at 38.
84. Id.
85. 938 P.2d 863 (Wyo. 1997).
86. Id. at 866.
87. See Scott v. Sisco Food Servs., No. Civ A 99-2150, 1999 WL 554599 (E.D. Pa. June
18, 1999) (finding that the protection of a grievance procedure renders the additional tort remedy
unnecessary); Keenan v. Allen, 91 F.3d 1275, 1280 n.7 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming the district
court's holding that the public policy exception applies only to at-will employees).
88. Smith v. Bates Technical Coll., 139 Wash. 2d 793, 796, 991 P.2d 1135, 1137 (2000).
89. Id.
90. See WASH. REV. CODE § 41.56.024 (2001).
91. Smith, 139 Wash. 2d at 796, 991 P.2d at 1137.
92. See WASH. REV. CODE § 41.56.201 (2001).
93. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 41.56.010-.950 (2001). RCW 41.56 provides remedies for any
alleged unfair labor practices by a state technical college employer. This statute also provides
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fore, Smith was covered by the statutory unfair labor practice provi-
sions94 and also by the labor-management CBA, which, among other
things, provided for employee discipline only "for cause" and estab-
lished a grievance procedure with arbitration as the final step.9"
Beginning in 1991, Smith was involved in a series of disputes
with her supervisors, with Smith believing that she was not being
treated fairly and properly and her supervisors claiming that she was
uncooperative and insubordinate. 96 From July 1993 through January
1994, Smith filed seven grievances under the CBA17 She was repri-
manded on three separate occasions.9" On February 11, 1994, the
President of Bates terminated Smith's employment, and Smith filed a
grievance contesting her termination.99 On May 7, 1994, an arbitrator
issued an award favorable to Smith, finding that she was not termi-
nated for cause and that Bates had not followed progressive discipline
procedures."' Bates complied with the arbitration award by reinstat-
ing Smith, providing back pay and accrued benefits of more than
$13,300, and purging her personnel file of all records about the case."'
Smith also filed four separate unfair labor practice charges with
the State Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC) under
sections 41.56.140 and 41.56.160 of the Revised Code of Washington
(RCW). °2 She filed two of the unfair labor practice charges before,
and two after, her termination. In the charges, she complained of un-
fair workplace treatment, retaliation for filing grievances, and the ter-
mination of her employment.' Before PERC could address the un-
fair labor practice charges, Smith filed suit in Pierce County Superior
Court. 104
Smith sued Bates, the college district, and four of her supervisors,
seeking damages for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy
(retaliation against her for filing grievances and complaints), defama-
tion (by Smith's supervisors and Bates), and for violation of her First
Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (the right to petition and
classified employees of Washington's technical colleges with the right to engage in union activity
and to collectively bargain for rights and benefits beyond those provided by the statute.
94. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 41.56.140, .160 (2001).
95. Smith, 139 Wash. 2dat 798, 991 P.2d at 1137.
96. Id. at 797, 991 P.2d at 1137.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 798, 991 P.2d at 1137.
99. Id.
100. See Respondent's Brief at 18, Smith v. Bates Technical Coll., 91 Wash. App. 1008
(1998) (No. 19937-8-I).
101. Smith, 139 Wash. 2d at 799, 991 P.2d at 1138.
102. Id.
103. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 100, at 16-17.
104. Smith, 139 Wash. 2d at 799, 991 P.2d at 1138.
[Vol. 25:677
Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy
the right to associate)." 5 The trial court granted Bates's summary
judgment motion in part and dismissed Smith's wrongful discharge
claim for failure to exhaust her remedies with the PERC. °6 The trial
court also dismissed the § 1983 First Amendment violation claims, be-
fore the trial for Bates, and after the trial for the named individuals)0 7
Only the defamation claim proceeded to trial, and the jury found that
Smith had not been defamed.' In an unpublished opinion, the
Washington Court of Appeals (Division II) affirmed the superior
court decision.0 9 The Washington Supreme Court granted review on
the wrongful discharge in violation of public policy and the § 1983
claims."0 In a divided opinion,"' the Washington Supreme Court re-
versed the trial court's dismissal of Smith's wrongful discharge claim
and remanded the case to the trial court.12
B. The Smith Court's Reasoning and Findings on the Availability of the
Public Policy Tort in Washington
In Smith, the Washington Supreme Court held that the tort of
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy is available to all em-
ployees, including those protected by a CBA or other administrative
procedure.' The Smith majority cited Thompson v. St. Regis Paper
Co." '4 as the first Washington case to recognize the public policy tort.
The Thompson court found that the tort of wrongful discharge in vio-
lation of public policy has been used in instances where application of
the terminable-at-will doctrine would have led to a result clearly in-
consistent with a stated public policy and the community interest it
advances."' The Smith court then concluded, "[T]hus, in Washing-
ton the tort of wrongful discharge is not designed to protect an em-
ployee's purely private interest in his or her continued employment;
rather, the tort operates to vindicate the public interest in prohibiting
employers from acting in a manner contrary to fundamental public
105. Id.
106. Id. at 799, 991 P.2d at 1139.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 800, 991 P.2d at 1139.
109. Smith v. Bates Technical Coll., 91 Wash. App. 1008 (1998) (unpublished opinion).
110. Smith, 139 Wash. 2d at 796, 991 P.2d at 1137.
111. Justice Sanders authored the majority opinion, with Justices Alexander, Smith, John-
son, Madsen, and Ireland concurring. Justices Talmadge, joined by Justice Guy, concurred in
part and dissented in part.
112. The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the § 1983 claim, see Smith, 139
Wash. 2d. at 816, 991 P.2d at 1147, but this Note does not address this issue.
113. Smith, 139 Wash. 2d at 816, 991 P.2d at 1147.
114. 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984).
115. Seeid.at 231,685 P.2d at 1088.
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policy. '1 16 The court found contrary cases from other jurisdictions to
be unpersuasive. The court read Thompson as giving a right inde-
pendent of contractual rights and emphasized the broader purpose of
vindication of public interest.
In addition, the Smith majority noted with approval the 1997
Washington Court of Appeals (Division I) decision in Wilson v. City
of Monroe,117 in which the court held that the public policy tort ex-
tends to all employees, regardless of other available remedies. The
Wilson court relied upon federal labor policy, which avoids preemp-
tion of state claims if no contract issues are implicated,"' and upon the
court's finding that the issue before the court did not depend on the
meaning of any CBA provisions." 9
The Smith majority also noted the fundamental distinction be-
tween tort and contract actions and the remedies available for each,
stating that duties of conduct giving rise to torts are based primarily
on social policy. 2' Further:
What is vindicated through the [tort] cause of action is not the
term or promises of the particular employment relationship in-
volved, but rather the public interest in not permitting employ-
ers to impose as a condition of employment a requirement that
an employee act in a manner contrary to fundamental public
policy.'21
The majority concluded that it logically follows that if an em-
ployee is terminated in violation of a clear mandate of public policy,
the employee should be permitted to recover for the violation of his or
her legal rights.122
C. The Smith Dissent on Extension of the Public Policy Tort
The Smith dissent partly concurred in the result 123 but disagreed
that the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy should
be extended to those employees covered by administrative procedures
or collective bargaining agreements with "just cause" termination
116. Smith, 139 Wash. 2d at 801, 991 P.2dat 1140 (emphasis omitted).
117. 88 Wash. App. 113, 943 P.2d 1134 (1997).
118. See generally Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988); see also
discussion supra Part III(B).
119. Wilson, 88 Wash. App. at 117,943 P.2d at 1136.
120. Smith, 139 Wash. 2d at 804, 991 P.2d 1141.
121. Id. at 804, 991 P.2d at 1141 (quoting Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373
n.7 (Cal. 1988)).
122. Id.
123. The dissent concurred in the dismissal of the § 1983 First Amendment claim. Id. at
816, 991 P.2d at 1147 (Talmadge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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rights. 124 Contrary to the majority, the dissent found that the public
policy tort is meant to afford "job security protections to employees
who, unlike civil servants or employees subject to a collective bargain-
ing agreement (CBA), may have no other remedy for arbitrary em-
ployer conduct.' ' 125 The dissent also criticized the majority for over-
looking the weight of authority from other jurisdictions against
extending the tort to employees covered by CBAs.'26 As noted in Part
III(C) of this Note, the weight of authority is actually split.
D. Analysis of the Smith Court's Holding on Extension of the Public
Policy Tort
The Smith majority correctly decided that the public policy tort
is available to all employees under Washington law, regardless of con-
tractual coverage. The Thompson decision, relied upon by the major-
ity, specifically addressed the purpose of recognizing the public policy
tort: "[t]he policy underlying the exception is that the common law
doctrine [of employment-at-will] cannot be used to shield an em-
ployer's action which otherwise frustrates a clear manifestation of pub-
lic policy."' 27 The Thompson court cited, as an example, the case of
Harless v. First National Bank,128 in which a bank employee was dis-
charged after attempting to make his employer comply with consumer
credit and protection laws.' 29 The discharge in that case would other-
wise frustrate a clear manifestation of public policy, protection of con-
sumers of credit. 30
The Thompson court recognized that employee job security is also
protected against employer actions that contravene public policy,'
but this was not the stated policy reason behind the court's recognition
of this cause of action. Thus, in Thompson, the Washington Supreme
Court established that the basis for the public policy tort in Washing-
ton is the protection of the public policy implicated by the activity giv-
ing rise to the discharge. Permitting employers to discharge employ-
ees whose actions are beneficial to society would discourage employees
from acting in the best interest of the public.1 32
124. Id. at 817, 991 P.2d at 1147 (Talmadge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 820, 991 P.2d at 1149 (Talmadge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
127. Thompson, 102 Wash. 2d at 231, 685 P.2d. at 1088.
128. 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978).
129. Id. at 272.
130. Thompson, 102 Wash. 2d at 232, 685 P.2d at 1088-89.
131. Id. at 233, 685 P.2d at 1089.
132. In Harless, the best interest of the public was the protection of consumer credit, but it
may be, for instance, notice of safety rules violations, serving on a jury, participating in collective
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Each state, either through legislation or through the development
of common law, is free to define the scope of causes of action for em-
ployee discharge. The distinction between the cases from other juris-
dictions133 is based on the underlying policy or purpose of recognizing
this tort. Those jurisdictions that recognize a tort claim by CBA-
covered employees do so either because of the vindication of the pub-
lic interest or because of the difference in possible remedies. Those
jurisdictions that prohibit the public policy tort for CBA-covered em-
ployees reason that either existing CBA protections are adequate or
that the rights of parties to contract must be protected. The Smith
majority identified the vindication of the public interest as the basis
for the public policy tort in Washington.
The Smith majority furthers the evolution of tort law"'g as it rec-
ognizes the impact that private disputes have on societal interests.
Preventing employers from discouraging socially beneficial behavior
actually encourages employees (and citizens in general) to meet their
societal and community obligations. This admittedly exceeds the
original fundamental purpose of tort law (adjusting the losses of the
plaintiff) but is consistent with the broader, modern purpose of the
law, which focuses on both the deterrence of tortious acts and the ad-
vancement of societal interests.
The result in Smith also agrees with the United States Supreme
Court's holding in Lingle v. Norge. In that case, the Court held that
the Labor Management Relations Act preempts state law only if the
state law claim requires interpretation of a collective bargaining
agreement. 3 ' The policy behind Lingle is the fostering of uniform ad-
judication of cases that involve disputes over the meaning of CBAs 36
Interpretation of CBAs should remain with arbitrators, who have the
requisite knowledge and expertise in industrial relations. The courts
should decide questions related to labor-management relations only if
it is not necessary to construe the CBA.'37 Applying the reasoning in
Lingle to the facts in Smith, Smith's claim did not involve interpreta-
tion of the CBA, and although the arbitrator certainly looked at the
facts spanning both issues, preemption would not occur under federal
labor policy.
bargaining-any of the "public policies" that a State has recognized as warranting protection.
Harless, 246 S.E.2d 170.
133. See supra Part III(C).
134. See supra Part II(A).
135. Because Smith was a state employee, the NLRA does not apply. However, in cases
involving non-public employees, this issue does come into play. Regardless, the policy issues are
relevant.
136. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 410-11 (1988).
137. Id.at411.
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Finally, as noted in Part III(A), the arbitration process is a crea-
tion of the parties to the CBA. The resistance of employers to adding
extra-contractual remedies, and the reluctance of arbitrators to award
these remedies, argue against the exclusivity of the arbitration process
for unionized workers.
V. EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES
A. Washington Law on Exhaustion of Remedies
The Washington Supreme Court has stated, "A party must gen-
erally exhaust all available administrative remedies prior to seeking re-
lief in superior court."' 38 This principle is founded upon the belief
that the judiciary should give proper deference to that body possessing
expertise in areas outside the conventional expertise of judges. 39 The
United States Supreme Court in McKart v. United States4 ° stated the
policies underlying this principle: (1) to insure against premature in-
terruption of the administrative process; (2) to allow the agency to de-
velop the necessary factual background on which to base a decision;
(3) to allow exercise of agency expertise in its area; (4) to provide for a
more efficient process; and (5) to protect the administrative agency's
autonomy by allowing it to correct its own errors and insuring that in-
dividuals were not encouraged to ignore its procedures by resorting to
the courts.'
B. Smith and the Exhaustion of Remedies
Smith filed four unfair labor practice charges with the State Pub-
lic Employment Relations Commission (PERC) under RCW
41.56.140 and 41.56.160.142 She filed two charges before her termina-
tion, and two after.'43 In the charges, Smith complained of unfair
workplace treatment, retaliation for filing grievances, and the termina-
tion of her employment. 144 Before PERC could address the unfair la-
138. Citizens for Mount Vernon v. City of Mount Vernon, 133 Wash. 2d 861, 866, 947
P.2d 1208, 1211 (1997) (citing Simpson Tacoma Kraft Co. v. Dept. of Ecology, 119 Wash. 2d
640, 646, 835 P.2d 1030 (1992)).
139. Id. (citing South Hollywood Hills Citizens Ass'n v. King County, 101 Wash. 2d 68,
73, 677 P.2d 114 (1984)).
140. 395 U.S. 185 (1969).
141. Id. at 193-94.
142. Smith v. Bates Technical Coll., 139 Wash. 2d 793, 799, 991 P.2d 1135, 1138 (2000).
143. Id.
144. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 100, at 16-17.
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bor practice charges, Smith filed suit in Pierce County Superior
Court.'45
The Smith majority held that an employee need not exhaust ad-
ministrative remedies before bringing an independent tort action for
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.'46 The majority
found that the tort was independent of any underlying contractual
agreement or civil service law.'47 The majority also found that PERC
had no authority over wrongful discharge claims, that these actions are
not within PERC's special expertise, and that tort-like damages are
not available through PERC. 48
The dissent in Smith again disagreed, stating, "This unfathom-
able extension of judicial power, heedless of any restraint, is not only
unsupported in law, but also positively dangerous to public employers
and employees. '"" ' The dissent favored giving deference to labor arbi-
trators and PERC in their respective areas of expertise. 50
C. Analysis of the Smith Court's Exhaustion Holding
The Smith majority incorrectly decided this issue. The majority
should have held that Smith must exhaust the available remedies to
her unfair labor practice charges before seeking judicial review.
As a state technical college employee, Smith was covered by civil
service protections under RCW 41.56.024.1" PERC derives its au-
thority from the legislature under RCW 41.58, the statute that created
PERC, and under RCW 41.56, the Public Employees Collective Bar-
gaining Act. PERC "[i]s empowered and directed to prevent any un-
fair labor practice and to issue appropriate remedial orders."' 152 Smith
filed four such unfair labor practice charges. Bates contended that
even if the public policy tort were extended to all employees, Smith
did not state a claim for violation of public policy.'53 Bates claimed
that Smith's grievances dealt with commonplace, personal workplace
disputes that are of no public concern. 5 4 The majority found that a
cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy ex-
ists where an employee is fired for exercising a legal right or privi-
145. Smith, 139 Wash. 2d at 799, 991 P.2d at 1139.
146. Id. at 811, 991 P.2d at 1145.
147. Id. at 809, 991 P.2d at 1143.
148. Id. at 810, 991 P.2d at 1144.
149. Id. at 823, 991 P.2d at 1150 (Talmadge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 796, 991 P.2dat 1137.
152. WASH. REV. CODE § 41.56.160 (2001).
153. Smith, 139 Wash. 2d at 807, 991 P.2dat 1142.
154. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 100, at 16.
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lege.55 The public policy at issue is that it is an unfair labor practice
for a public employer to discharge a public employee for engaging in
the protected activity of pursuing a grievance."'
The remedial powers of PERC are not limited to back pay, rein-
statement, or the traditional breach of contract remedies."5 7 The legis-
lature did not place any restrictions on the remedies that PERC could
award." 8 Contrary to the majority's finding, PERC could have re-
quired the payment of damages to Smith, if it found that damages
were warranted. "If the commission determines that any person has
engaged in ... an unfair labor practice, the commission shall ... take
such affirmative action as will effectuate the purposes and policy of
this chapter, such as the payment of damages and the reinstatement of
employees." '159 The Washington Supreme Court has previously rec-
ognized PERC's expertise in resolving labor disputes and in fashion-
ing remedies. 6° In Smith's situation, the Washington statute, which
protects public employees from discharge for pursuing a grievance,
provides for its own administrative remedy - the PERC unfair labor
practice process.
In an analogous federal labor law case, Lingle v. Norge, the Su-
preme Court concluded that although section 301 of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act preempts state law only insofar as resolution of
the state law claims requires interpretation of the CBA, other federal
labor law principles might preempt state law."' The Lingle Court
stated that when it is clear, or may fairly be assumed, that the activi-
ties in question are protected by section 7 of the NLRA 62 or that such
activities constitute an unfair labor practice under section 8 of the
NLRA, 63 state jurisdiction must yield. 64  "[I]t is essential to the ad-
ministration of the NLRA that these determinations be left in the first
155. Smith, 139 Wash. 2d at 807, 991 P2d. at 1143.
156. Id.
157. WASH. REV. CODE § 41.56.160.
158. See id.
159. See id. § 41.56.160(2).
160. See Municipality of Metro. Seattle v. Pub. Employment Relations Comm'n, 118
Wash. 2d 621, 826 P.2d 158 (1992).
161. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 409 n.8 (1988).
162. National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2001) (Rights of Employees) (cov-
ering the rights of employees to organize, form, join, or assist labor organizations, bargain collec-
tively, or to engage in concerted activities for mutual aide or self-protection, or to refrain from
such activities).
163. National Labor Relations Act § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2001) (Unfair Labor Practices)
(covering various employer unfair labor practices).
164. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 409 n.8 (citing San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359
U.S. 236, 244 (1959)).
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instance to the National Labor Relations Board [(NLRB)]"165 Here,
since the legislature has given PERC the power to prevent and remedy
unfair labor practices (analogous to the NLRB's federal authority), the
jurisdiction of the state courts should likewise yield.
Thus, the majority's conclusion that Smith need not exhaust
other remedies was based upon the erroneous reasoning: (1) that the
tort was independent of any underlying contractual agreement or civil
service law; (2) that these actions were not within PERC's special ex-
pertise; and (3) that tort-like damages were not available though
PERC. Smith, therefore, should have been required to exhaust the
remedies available through PERC before bringing an independent ac-
tion in court. 66
The exhaustion requirement would not deprive Smith of the op-
portunity for judicial review. RCW 41.56.160(3) permits PERC to
petition the appropriate superior court for the enforcement of its or-
ders, and PERC decisions in unfair labor practice cases are reviewable
under the provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act.167 Fur-
thermore, an employee with civil service protection may utilize a cause
of action specifically created by statute (i.e., where the legislature has
specifically created a protection).168
VI. CONCLUSION
In Smith v. Bates Technical College, the Washington Supreme
Court appropriately extended the tort of wrongful discharge in viola-
tion of public policy to all employees, regardless of collective bargain-
ing agreement coverage. Following Washington precedent and policy,
the court properly based its holding on vindication of the underlying
public policy interest: employers should be discouraged from retaliat-
ing against employees who are acting in the public interest. This
holding is also consistent with analogous federal labor relations law on
preemption of state claims involving interpretation or application of
CBAs. This holding continues the historical progression of the em-
ployment relationship from employment-at-will, through a collective
bargaining approach, to the present day emphasis on protection of
both individual rights and societal interests.
165. Id.
166. Smith did exhaust her remedies in the grievance-arbitration process. But, as noted,
her tort claim is independent of the arbitration because interpretation of the CBA is not involved,
and (arguably) arbitrators are reluctant to address the damages issue.
167. City of Pasco v. Pub. Employment Relations Comm'n, 119 Wash. 2d 504, 833 P.2d
381 (1992).
168. Smith v. Bates Technical Coll., 139 Wash. 2d 793, 823, 991 P.2d 1135, 1150 (2000).
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The court, however, incorrectly decided the issue of exhaustion
of remedies. The Washington Public Employment Relations Com-
mission should have been allowed to adjudicate Smith's unfair labor
practice charges. PERC is empowered by the legislature to address
precisely this type of claim. PERC has the required expertise and can
structure and enforce remedies, including damages. The court should
have given proper deference to PERC's jurisdiction and expertise.
Where, as in Smith, an aggrieved employee has administrative reme-
dies available, and those remedies would not be futile, the employee
should be required to exhaust those remedies.
